Where did the scammers access to the latest databases of clients of the savings Bank? (1 photo)

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16.30 Moscow to save energy Zрения Yesterday with the editor of a publication to save energy Zрения happened interesting story. Received a call allegedly from the security service of Sberbank. The call was fraudulent, that was clear immediately. But another question arises, the author of these lines, editor of the publication — just as the week is a customer of the savings Bank, and before that, I never was!

Call came on 21 November in the middle of the day, with a phone number registered in the Moscow region +7(495) 595-55-50. A male voice on the other side was presented by the representative financial security of the savings Bank. But before he did, he called the exact surname, name and patronymic of the author of these lines. In addition, the scammer asked whether in the last half hour at the customer’s (the author of these lines) suspicious transactions.

The essence of the situation is that literally half an hour before the call was fraud, the author was in the Department of Sberbank, and actually drew two payments in the amount of 18,000 rubles, one of the payments took place on the card of Sberbank in the Bank. Second, just cash in the Bank.

Of course, I immediately realized it was a Scam. The man asked me have you received any suspicious calls, to which I replied that I think it is their call suspicious. Then the scammer told me to go to any branch of the savings Bank and hung up.

Breaking through the phone number that called scammers in the Internet, it is very immediately and easily find that it is a Scam that only work for Sberbank. There are lots of reviews from people online that say they calling from this number supposedly the savings Bank, and reports on suspicious transactions on their card. Also, you can easily understand that getting the clients of Sberbank card holders. Which, incidentally, is very logical, otherwise what is the point of the fraudsters to do it.

Keys to rooms from Yandex, also defines this number as fraudulent.

Where did the scammers access to the latest databases of clients of the savings Bank?
And in this regard, is the most interesting question I have. According to the author of these lines very accurately and clearly to see that the scammers may have somehow access to the most recent and relevant personal data of clients of Sberbank.


Why is it you can see it on my personal example, read below.

This one could question, but that’s not me. Now here’s the thing, it turns out, the author of these lines — not marred nor in any database. As elementary, the previous decade lived in Ukraine and did not even have the numbers of the phone that could call the scammers.

When moving to Russia, to Moscow, after I had a Russian number, and the scammers I never called. Since elementary, I’m NOT IN the DATABASES and could not be there physically.

But I had to have a card of Sberbank, and it was only a week ago, a week later, I was on the phone the scammers are represented by Sberbank it, and call my exact name, besides, calling half an hour later after committing a transaction on a brand new and fresh card of Sberbank, in which the transaction more was not.

Perfect «sterile» case, to see and understand how fraudsters operate by clients of Sberbank.

At first glance, you may think that scammers are calling everyone. You might think that’s a coincidence. But I am a grown man and very experienced journalist. As a journalist, I used to compare facts. Of course, I believe in coincidences, but I do not believe that these coincidences of several. Don’t believe, and simply not obliged to believe, as a reasonable man. So several coincidences are not coincidences, and REGULARITY. But a pattern already indicates the intent chain of events where someone is.

Here, judge for yourself:


The coincidence of the first — Scammers know not only my phone, but the exact name in the context of binding a name to a phone number. Ie they know exactly who is calling.

The coincidence of the second — Fraudsters know that I am a client of Sberbank (as presented Sberbank, the caller of the transaction on my card of Sberbank the same)

The third coincidence — the Scammers called half an hour later, after the real transaction through my card in the branch of Sberbank.

The fourth coincidence — I became a customer of the savings Bank only a week ago, before many years I just lived in Russia, and the client of the savings Bank just could not be, and could not be any bases of the savings Bank, especially the older ones.

The fifth coincidence — I live in Russia for a year, and I never called cheaters. Yeah, tried all the services, medical centers, cosmetology, and stuff like that. But the banking scams Bank card — never. And only I get a credit card of Sberbank — as the scammers Bank fraud immediately called.

Of course, I would never and will never believe in such coincidences, if they had three, but then their 5 (!!!).

Accordingly, I see this specific pattern, which indicates to me that the database with my personal data got to the Scam a week later, as I was in this base was made by issuing a card of Sberbank.


Of course, all happens in life, but a chain of unlikely coincidences, is close to zero, this will tell any mathematician, based on the theory of probability. But if you think this is a coincidence, it’s just then, Divine Providence!

I, as a real person, sensible, journalist with experience who do not believe in such coincidences, the question arises: If it is not a coincidence, then how fraudsters can obtain, and whether, in such a short period current database of clients of the savings Bank? How is it possible and is it possible?

The exact answer to this question is no, but I can guess. Being an experienced journalist, I know how it is. I know the cost of such customer databases, not necessarily banks, but in General databases. Approximate cost is on the black market from $1 to $3 dollars for a single name in the database. In some cases, $5 per name. Imagine that these databases consist of hundreds of thousands of people. Take even the most ordinary base of 100,000 people, multiply by $3 received 300,000 dollars for a relatively small database!!! I think few people can resist such sums, when you «merged» the fraudsters small base, and got 300-500 thousand dollars.

This huge amount of money for which people who sell these bases to the scammers, can go to great lengths and take any risk.

Of course, I’m not accusing this article of Sberbank. Sberbank is a very good and reliable Bank, the oldest. That’s why I opened the account and card, and I I will remain a customer of this Bank, like millions of Russians. This Bank really provides a lot of useful and very convenient service. And from scams no one is immune, neither the people nor the banks. But in my example we can assume with great certainty that the scammers have somehow, unknown to me, access to databases of Sberbank. How else to explain such improbable coincidences 5, in an accident of which a reasonable person, it is impossible to believe.

As I then can believe the statements of German Gref said that in September was leaked, only the data of 5,000 customers of Sberbank, and the base was old. And this leak was only in the history of Sberbank. In September I was not yet a client of Sberbank. My data while under the bridge?

That’s what today said Gref Forbes, commenting on the September leaking a customer database.


«Until now, we were protecting data from the outside we built a wall, which is almost impossible to break. But at the same time, we have not done enough to protect against internal betrayal. We were betrayed by an employee who was trained and graduated from one of the best universities in the country, we held additional training, and then, using all his knowledge, decided on the offence of data theft, which had access on duty. This, of course, the harsh lesson for us,» said Gref.

«It was the only data leak in the history of the operation of credit institutions. We radically revised and will continue to revise the mode of access and system use to protect the data from internal betrayal. We introduce a special regime of control of those employees who are always in virtue of his office will have access to critical systems», — added the head of Sberbank.

But, just yesterday, November 21, in the middle of the day with me and there was a case that proves the opposite!

Yes, of course, I could be wrong, but you know, I just can’t somehow «flip» yourself, your mind,your life experience, and believe it! And no one will ever make me believe it. Otherwise, how to explain then conclusively — I live in Russia for a year. This year I never — I never received fraudulent calls from scammers claiming to be a savings Bank. But when I open the account in Sberbank, as the fraudsters do not have to wait long, and a week later called me, having data that: a) I am a client of Sberbank b) with my exact name) with my phone number — relative binding it to my name (!!!) g) is it possible having the data about the Commission of trisakti my card of Sberbank.

I believe then that the data breach of customers of Sberbank was only once in the history of the Bank, as stated by German Gref? How to believe other people who do exactly the same calls?

I think the problem is not us, the customers, and the savings Bank. Something, perhaps, the institution is not working properly. And something probably should be changed. And something to do!

I think that Herman Gref too sure about the security system of the savings Bank. And this confidence is very strongly lulls the vigilance. That in itself is a major vulnerability. And we must take action!

I have already written above, how much such a database, it is crazy money. There are few people able to resist the temptation to «merge database» and get half a million dollars! And it is the human factor. No computer security system will not protect when it comes to such money, and especially the human factor.

But with this problem no one is fighting. Because nobody represents. Here in this last statement of Herman Gref it is evident that he identified the problem, but completely incorrect. They say, Yes, the human factor, one employee of the merged base in the 5,000 But such personnel may not be one (!!!), and it may be because you just did not that is almost the only case in the history of the Bank, and just did the opposite. That the problem could be SYSTEMIC in NATURE! How else then to explain my specific case? If someone has an explanation, I am ready to discuss!

I tried yesterday to identify the savings Bank and draw it to their attention. I called immediately after this fraudulent call to the hot line of Sberbank. To me it confirmed that I didn’t call the savings Bank. But to me it was so clear The question then, is not in it!

I told them that I was a customer of the savings Bank only a week, and asked how my information got to the scammers after only a week after I became a customer of the Bank.

Me this question no one answered, said they will inspect, and I can apply to law enforcement agencies.

But it’s not cool guys. Here it is talking about the fact that in such cases the savings Bank and have to pay attention and react in the most serious way, if you like, says Gref, they want to build real security. So here is my personal and unique case shows that you can «merge» the database of clients of the savings Bank somehow, almost in real time!

As editor of the official media publications to save energy Zрения, I here this article and I appeal to the leadership of the savings Bank with the aim to pay attention to this case and take action!

photo: in the article — the screenshot of the search request Yandex\ cover — photo of the building savings Bank — the source — the official website of Sberbank

text: Alexander Dot

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